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Abstract: 
This chapter is the introduction to the forthcoming edited collection “Law in Transition: 
Human Rights, Developments and Transitional Justice”, edited by the authors and 
forthcoming with Hart Publishing (Oxford, 2013). The book will appear in the “Osgoode 
Reader” series and brings together many of the leading experts of the increasingly pertinent 
intersection of development, rights and transitional justice studies. The Introduction traces the 
theoretical and practical challenges of this discursive interaction and argues that it is only 
through such dialogue that a better understanding of the institutional and normative issues 
arising in contemporary law & development and TJ contexts will be possible. The chapter 
provides an overview of the history of the law & development movement, which is then 
discussed together with the rise of human rights theory and critique, especially against the 
background of decolonization, the rise of so-called ‘Third World Approaches in International 
Law’ [TWAIL], the rise and ambivalent aftermath of the Washington Consensus as well as 
the proliferation of post-conflict and law reform initiatives around the world. Transitional 
Justice, as a relatively young ‘legal’ field, brings to the table a host of interdisciplinary 
challenges arising from the complexity of post-conflict, state building and law reform 
contexts. The present chapter as well as the ensuing contributions to the edited collection 
highlight the importance of bringing these important fields in closer dialogue with each other. 
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Approximating Law and Development, Human Rights and 
Transitional Justice 
 
Peer Zumbansen & Ruth Buchanan, Osgoode Hall Law School 
 
I.  INTERSECTIONS 
The contributions to this volume span the fast growing areas of “law and development”, 
“transitional justice” and “human rights”. The participating authors are well aware of the 
challenges which arise out of the attempt both to cross and to relativise boundaries, as well as 
to bridge discourses. And, perhaps, the apparent ease with which the authors convened here 
navigate the complexity of intersecting, in themselves continuously evolving, scholarly 
discourses and academic-political practices, might gloss over the intricacies of the exercise. 
But just how challenging the undertaking carried out by these authors really is becomes 
clearer when we realise that no area here is, in itself, easily categorised or mapped out with 
the aspiration of full comprehensiveness. Instead, the present volume intervenes at the cross-
section of these three fields at a time in which considerable maturing, reflection and re-
visiting has been occurring for quite some time in each of the respective areas, prompting us 
both to take stock now and to highlight the nature of the overlap, dialogue and cross-
fertilisation of these discourses. The choice of our three areas of interest is by no means 
arbitrary: while “human rights” (HR) is arguably the “oldest” among the three legal fields in 
question here, it shares the inner complexity and dynamic content that characterise the other 
two. Law and development (L&D) is itself a - comparatively - younger field, but one with a 
tremendously rich, layered and contested history.
1
 As scholars in the field have shown and as 
some of the contributors to this volume further illustrate, L&D brings into dialogue a wide 
range of legal and non-legal fields, and thus becomes part of scholarly and policy discourses 
                                                 
1
  For a seminal statement, see David Trubek & Marc Galanter, “Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some 
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States”, (1974) Wisconsin Law 
Review, p 1062); see, some thirty years later, the reflections in David Trubek & Alvaro Santos, 
“Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and Development Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical 
Practice”, in: David Trubek & Alvaro Santos (eds), The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical 
Appraisal 1 (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006). See, also, R. Buchanan, “A Crisis and its 
Afterlife: Some Reflections on ‘Scholars in Self-Estrangement’”, in: G de Búrca, C Fitzpatrick & J Scott 
(eds), Critical Studies of Global Governance: Liber Amicorum for David Trubek, (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2013). 
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ranging from “development studies”,
2
 economics and economic geography,
3
 trade law
4
 to 
post-colonial studies.
5
 A similar intersection of theoretical and deeply practice-driven 
approaches can be observed in the third area which this book is placing under scrutiny: 
transitional justice. While more will be said on this field later in this introduction, it deserves 
mentioning that, like HR and L&D, transitional justice (TJ) continues to defy a straight-
forward categorisation, be that with regard to its basic assumptions or its aspirations,
6
 its 
methodological foundations, as well as its theoretical versus practical aspirations.
7
 
The following introduction seeks to set the stage for this cross-examination among the 
three fields of scientific inquiry involved, which we understand to include legal as well as 
socio-economic, cultural and political practice. The latter cluster of connections is of 
particular importance in view of the acute awareness among TJ scholars of the need both to 
expand and to deepen their agenda’s reach in order to address, with a view to long-term 
sustainability, the trajectories and the persistence of the social and economic “grievances”,
8
 
“inequalities”,
9
 “structural violence”
10
 or “root causes”
11
 of societal conflict, exclusion and 
silencing. It will do so by first alluding to questions of context with regard to the emergence 
                                                 
2
  JE Goldthorpe. The Sociology of Post-Colonial Societies: Economic Disparity, Cultural Diversity, and 
Development, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996); Jeffrey Haynes, Development Studies, 
(Cambridge-Malden MA, Polity Press, 2008). 
3
  Paul A David, “Krugman's Economic Geography of Development: NEGs, POGs, and Naked Models in 
Space”, (1999) 22 International Regional Science Review, p 162; Richard Peet, Unholy Trinity: The IMF, 
World Bank and WTO, 2nd ed. (London-New York, Zed Books, 2009). 
4
  Jagdish Bhagwati, The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries, (New York-Toronto: McGraw Hill, 1966); 
Jeffrey G. Williamson, Trade and Poverty: When the Third World Fell Behind, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 
2011) 
5
  Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World; with a new 
preface by the author, (Princeton NJ-Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2012); Sundhya Pahuja. 
Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Luis Eslava & Sundhya Pahuja, “Between Resistance and 
Reform: TWAIL and the Universality of International Law”, (2012) 3 Trade, Law and Development, p 103. 
6
  See, for example, the excellent analysis provided by Rama Mani, “Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional 
Justice, or Forging the Nexus between Transitional Justice and Development”, (2008) 2 International 
Journal of Transitional Justice, p 253. 
7
  Christine Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field’”, (2009) 3 
International Journal of Transitional Justice, p 5. 
8
  Ismael Muvingi, “Sitting on Powder Kegs: Socioeconomic Rights in Transitional Justice”, (2009) 3 
International Journal of Transitional Justice, p 163. 
9
  Zinaida Miller, “Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the 'Economic' in Transitional Justice”, (2008) 2 
International Journal of Transitional Justice, p 266. 
10
  Ibid; see, also, Rosemary Nagy, Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical Reflections, Chapter 13 in 
this volume. 
11
  Susan Marks, “Root Causes and Human Rights”, (2011) 74 Modern Law Review, p 57. 
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and continuing development of the three fields in a wider discursive universe of both “law 
and society” as well as, more recently, “law and globalisation” debates.
12
 By not only 
situating the three identified areas against this background but also highlighting the 
interaction among them, we hope to show how any assessment of these fields is bound to be 
but a momentary snap-shot, which only fleetingly highlights certain features, while, perhaps 
unduly, obscuring others. In bringing together some of the most renowned experts in the three 
areas, we hope to shed at least some light on the intricacies as well as the “stakes” – 
methodological, and ultimately – political – in the areas under discussion here. Based upon 
the understanding that a primary objective of legal analysis ought to be the identification of 
the tension of “winning” versus the “losing” interpretations and applications of legal 
instruments, our aim here is first to relativise the alleged uniqueness of the three fields with 
regard to long existing, core legal areas – such as contract or tort, administrative or 
constitutional law. By highlighting how the interaction of such fields has, again and again, 
given rise to the formation of “new” legal areas, we can point to the dynamic of mutual 
responsiveness between legal norms and societal developments. While re-stating this very 
basic premise of legal sociology might seem trite and unnecessary to some contemporary 
readers, we argue that this dynamic demands renewed attention in a legal education and 
professional context that is shaped by at least two powerful trajectories. In the next section, 
we review the development of the three identified fields against the background of a 
significant shift which has been occurring both within law schools and within the world of 
legal practice. 
  
                                                 
12
  For an elaboration of this idea, see Peer Zumbansen, “The Ins and Outs of Transnational Private Regulatory 
Governance: Legitimacy, Accountability, Effectiveness and a New Concept of ‘Context’”, (2012) 13 
German Law Journal, p 1269; and idem., Sociological Jurisprudence 2.0: Updating Law’s Inter-
disciplinarity in a Global Context, Chapter 18 in this volume. 
5 
 
II.  BREAKING DOWN BOUNDARIES: “LAW AND SOCIETY”, “LAW AND 
GLOBALISATION”, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
In the light of the seemingly unfaltering creativity on the part of legal scholars to extend the 
boundaries of existing legal fields in response to pressures, say, from technological change,
13
 
social transformation
14
 and from the fast proliferating spheres of social and institutional 
practice
15
, the emergence and rapid consolidation of a “new” legal field has come to be seen 
as an ordinary event.
16
 And yet, it appears as though the memory of truly innovative field-
creations in law – such as in the exemplary cases of environmental
17
 or cyberspace law
18
 - are 
quite short-lived, at least to the degree that scholars when they are confronted with the 
necessity (and, the opportunity) to reflect upon the ways in which law “reacts” to change, for 
example, under the rubrics of “internationalisation”, or “globalisation”, continue to lament 
the absence of reliable analytical frameworks and definitions.
19
 Meanwhile, the examples to 
be found in a field such as environmental law, which emerged from, and eventually grew 
beyond, tort law responsibility,
20
 or internet law, which both effectively, and irreversibly,
21
 
                                                 
13
  Roger Brownsword & Morag Goodwin, Law and the Technologies of the Twenty-first Century: Text and 
Materials, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012); Alexia Herwig, “Transnational Governance 
Regimes for Foods Derived from Bio-Technology and their Legitimacy”, in: Christian Joerges, Inger-
Johanne Sand & Gunther Teubner (eds), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism, (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2004), p 199. 
14
  Lucinda Peach, Legislating Morality: Pluralism and Religious Identity in Lawmaking, (New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2002); Karl-Heinz Ladeur & Ino Augsberg, “The Myth of the Neutral State: The 
Relationship between State and Religion in the face of New Challenges”, (2007) 8 German Law Journal, p 
143; Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari’a, 
(Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2008). 
15
  David G Post, “Anarchy, State, and the Internet: An Essay on Law-Making in Cyberspace”, (1995) Journal 
of Online Law, available at: http://www.temple.edu/Lawschool/dpost/Anarchy.html; Julia Hörnle, “Disputes 
Solved in Cyberspace and the Rule of Law”, (2001) 7 The Journal of Information, Law and Technology, 
(now renamed the European Journal of Law and Technology), available at: 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2001_2/hornle; Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Malte Ziewitz, 
Jefferson Rebuffed: The United States and the Future of Internet Governance, (2007) 8 Columbia Science 
and Technology Law Review, p 188. 
16
  For the field of international law, see the remarkable essays in: Fleur Johns, Richard Joyce & Sundhya 
Pahuja (eds), Events: The Force of International Law, (London, Routledge-Cavendish, 2011). 
17
  Gunther Teubner, Lindsay Farmer & Declan Murphy (eds), Environmental Law and Ecological 
Responsibility: The Concept and Practice of Ecological Self-Organization, (Hoboken NJ, John Wiley and 
Sons, 1994). 
18
  Lawrence Lessig, “The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw might Teach”, (1999) 113 Harvard Law Review, 
p 501. 
19
  Ralf Michaels, “Globalization and Law: Law Beyond the State”, in: Reza Banakar & Max Travers, Law and 
Social Theory, 2nd ed., (Oxford-Portland OR, Hart Publishing, forthcoming); available at: 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2862, ms. at 1. 
20
  Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract, (Columbus OH, Ohio State University Press, 1974); Duncan 
6 
 
pushed beyond the confines of constitutional law and private law,
22
 can be seen as important 
reminders of law’s evolutionary nature,
23
 causing it to resist ascriptions of simple causality or 
mere linear trajectory.
24
 With these examples in mind, and although we can easily recognise 
the aspirations among our contemporaries to attribute an adequate label or even a specific 
status to emerging legal frameworks, we should nevertheless be mindful of the de facto 
normality of such struggles. In effect, such labelling anxieties multiply in the face of greater 
complexity, which serve to challenge the law in both form and substance with the alleged 
“new-ness” of a situation. In other words, law’s relation to society in its ever-changing nature 
has always been a dynamic shaped by the competing forces of change and resistance, 
misunderstanding, over-reach, trial and error.
25
 
Compared to the immensely rich, and, at the same time, precarious research and 
policy agenda of “law and society”,
26
 the formula “law and globalisation” describes a more 
                                                                                                                                                        
Kennedy, “Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to 
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, (1982) 41 Maryland Law Review, p 563; Peter H 
Schuck, Tort Law and the Public Interest: Competition, Innovation, and Consumer Welfare, (New York, 
WH Norton, 1991). 
21
  Lawrence Lessig, Code and other Laws of Cyberspace, (New York, Basic Books, 1999). 
22
  Henry H. Perritt Jr., “The Internet is changing the Public International Legal System”, (2000) 88 Kentucky 
Law Review, p 885; Jochen von Bernstorff, “The Structural Limitations of Network Governance: ICANN as 
a Case in Point”, in: Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand & Gunther Teubner (eds), Transnational 
Governance and Constitutionalism, (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004), p 257; Lucile M Ponte & Thomas D 
Cavenagh, Cyberjustice: Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) for E-Commerce, (Upper Saddle River NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 2004). 
23
  Simon Deakin, “Evolution for our Time: A Theory of Legal Memetics”, ESRC Centre for Business 
Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 242 (also published in (2002) 55 Current Legal 
Problems, pp 1-42), available at: www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP242.pdf; Peer Zumbansen & Gralf-Peter 
Calliess, “Law, Economics and Evolutionary Theory: State of the Art and Interdisciplinary Perspectives”, in: 
Peer Zumbansen & Gralf-Peter Calliess (eds), Law, Economics and Evolutionary Theory, (Cheltenham-
Northampton MA, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), p 1. 
24
  For the case of constitutional law, see Niklas Luhmann, “Verfassung als evolutionäre Errungenschaft”, 
(1989) 9 Rechtshistorisches Journal, p 176; see, also, Robert M Cover, “Nomos and Narrative”, (1983) 97 
Harvard Law Review, p 4, and Ernest A Young, “The Constitution outside the Constitution”, (2007) 117 
Yale Law Journal, p 408. 
25
  See, for example, Lawrence M Friedman, “Coming of Age: Law and Society Enters an Exclusive Club”, 
(2005) 1 Annual Review of Law and Social Sciences, pp 1-16; Ruth Buchanan, Stewart Motha & Sundhya 
Pahuja, “Introduction”, in: Ruth Buchanan, Stewart Motha & Sundhya Pahuja (eds), Reading Modern Law: 
Critical Methdologies and Sovereign Formations, (Abingdon-New York, Routledge, 2012), p 1; Peer 
Zumbansen, “Law’s Effectiveness and Law’s Knowledge: Reflections from Legal Sociology and Legal 
Theory”, (2009) 10 German Law Journal, p 417. 
26
  Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law”, 
(1987) 14 Journal of Law & Society, p 279; Gunther Teubner, “How the Law Thinks: Toward a 
Constructivist Epistemology of Law”, (1989) 23 Law & Society Review, p 727; Roger Cotterrell, “Why must 
Legal Ideas be Interpreted Sociologically?”, (1998) 25 Journal of Law & Society, p 171; Bryant Garth & 
Joyce Sterling, “From Legal Realism to Law & Society: Reshaping Law for the Last Stages of the Social 
7 
 
recent, but already no longer the newest, attempt at capturing the general meaning of law’s 
operations in an increasingly interconnected global space.
27
 Questioning existing 
methodologies, legal scholars, sociologists and anthropologists are examining the analytical 
and conceptual toolkits, the institutional orientation and normative value judgements that are 
employed in the multi- and inter-disciplinary context of globalisation studies.
28
 Meanwhile, 
the challenge for lawyers and institutional educators to interpret and to translate the 
challenges of a globalising world into effective legal practice
29
 as well as into the realities of 
a law-school classroom has only become greater.
30
 It seems promising, then, that legal 
scholars have been showing a growing interest in better understanding the widely-varied 
phenomena of globalisation and its impact on law, legal research and legal education.
31
 And, 
yet, despite ever-increasing efforts by lawyers and social scientists to study the complex 
                                                                                                                                                        
Activist State”, (1998) 32 Law & Society Review, p 409; Elizabeth Heger Boyle & John W. Meyer, “Modern 
Law as a Secularized and Global Model: Implications for the Sociology of Law”, in: Yves Dezalay & Bryant 
Garth (eds), Global Prescriptions. The Production, Exportation, and Importation of a New Legal Orthodoxy, 
(Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2002. 
27
  See the highly influential study by Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society: Information Age: 
Economy, Society and Culture, vol. I., 2nd ed., 2000, (Oxford-Cambridge MA, Blackwell Publishing, 1996), 
and two exemplary and very helpful depictions of the ways in which law has been reacting to globalization 
phenomena: Gunther Teubner, “The King’s Many Bodies: The Self-Deconstruction of Law’s Hierarchy”, 
(1997) 31 Law & Society Review, p 763, and Paul Schiff Berman, “From International Law to Law and 
Globalization”, (2005) 43 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, p 485. 
28
  See, for example, David M. Trubek, Yves Dezalay, Ruth Buchanan and John R. Davis, “Global restructuring 
and the law: Studies in the internationalization of legal fields and the creation of transnational arenas”, 
(1994) 44 Case Western Reserve Law Review, p 407; Jean Comaroff & John L Comaroff, Theory from the 
South: Or, How Euro-America is Evolving Toward Africa (The Radical Imagination), (New York, Paradigm 
Publishers, 2011); Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference, 2nd ed., [orig. 2000] (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 2007). 
29
  See, recently, the contributions to Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth (eds.), Lawyers and the Construction of 
Transnational Justice, (Oxford, Routledge, 2012); Harry W Arthurs & Kreklewich, “Law, Legal Institutions, 
and the Legal Profession in the New Economy”, (2000) 34 Osgoode Hall Law Journal, p 1; Mary C Daly, 
“The Ethical Implications of the Globalization of the Legal Profession: A Challenge to the Teaching of 
Professional Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century”, (1998) 21 Fordham International Law Journal, p 
1239. 
30
  Craig Scott, “A Core Curriculum for the Transnational Legal Education of JD and LLB Students: Surveying 
the Approach of the International, Comparative and Transnational Law Program at Osgoode Hall Law 
School”, (2005) 23 Pennsylvania State International Law Review, p 757; Gerald Torres, “Integrating 
Transnational Legal Perspectives Into the First Year Curriculum”, (2005) 23 Pennsylvania State 
International Law Review, p 801; Helge Dedek & Armand de Mestral, “'Born to be Wild': The 'Trans-
systemic' Programme at McGill and the De-Nationalization of Legal Education”, (2009) 10 German Law 
Journal, p 889; Peer Zumbansen, “Transnational Law, Evolving”, in: Jan M Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopedia 
of Comparative Law, 2nd ed., (Cheltenham-Northampton MA, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012), p 898. 
31
  See the Symposia: “Navigating the Transsystemic –Tracer le Transsystemique”, (2005) 50 McGill Law 
Journal, pp 701-984, and Nadia Chiesa, Adam de Luca & Bernadette Maheandiran (eds), “Following the 
Call of the Wild: The Promises and Perils of Transnationalizing Legal Education”, (2009) 10 German Law 
Journal, special issue, pp 629-1168, available at:  
http://germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/FullIssues/Vol_10_No_07.pdf. 
8 
 
relationship between domestic and global regulatory developments,
32
 when can we actually 
be sure that the conceptual toolkits used in these undertakings are adequate? The same doubts 
appear to haunt (at least some areas of) legal education. While it is true that law schools 
around the world have been addressing the perceived need to adapt their curricula to the 
evolving prospects of a legal profession with an increasingly global reach,
33
 most of such 
institutional undertakings remain marked by a concern which, first and foremost, regards the 
design of programmes that will provide graduates with the skills to offer optimal legal 
services in both domestic and global settings.
34
 As a result, law school curriculum reformers, 
in trying to strike a balance between these two universes of legal practice, are prone to add 
introductory courses (such as “Law and Globalization”, “Ethical Lawyering in a Global 
Context”) to their curriculum, while, often enough, bowing to the pressures of the bar to 
maintain a distinct focus on core, black letter, “bread and butter” courses. Meanwhile, and 
despite a long-standing, and continuing, tradition to push for a contextual study of business 
relations embedded in sociological analysis,
35
 seminars in comparative or transnational law, 
legal culture or legal anthropology, and even international business transactions or 
international business law, are usually only taken by a self-selected group of specialised 
students in their last year of law school. 
This “fence-sitting” is reflected, at least in part, in large parts of legal research; legal 
scholars, if the scope of research disseminated on the Social Science Research Network 
(www.ssrn.com) is any indication, likewise appear to focus their interests on matters of 
domestic significance, thus reflecting the primary orientation of legal practice for the 
majority of law school graduates. The world “outside” the nation state, even that of another 
                                                 
32
  Saskia Sassen, “The State and Globalization”, in: Joseph S Nye & John D Donahue (eds), Governance in a 
Globalizing World, (Washington DC, Brookings Institute, 2000), p 91; Alec Stone Sweet, 
“Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes”, (2009) 16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies, p 621. 
33
  For one of the most recent examples, see the case of New York University School of Law’s expansion 
through new law school campuses in Buenos Aires, Paris and Shanghai: available at:  
http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/NYU_LAW_ANNOUNCES_STUDY-
ABROAD_PROGRAM_CURRICULAR_ENHANCEMENTS_THIRD_YEAR. 
34
  See James Vescovi, “Why Does Law School Cost So Much?”, Columbia Law School, Communication 
Report, Summer 2006, available at:  
https://www.law.columbia.edu/law_school/communications/reports/summer06/lawschoolcost. 
35
  Stewart Macaulay, “Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of Contract”, (1977) 11 Law 
& Society Review, p 507; Gregory C Shaffer, “How Business Shapes Law: A Socio-Legal Framework”, 
(2009) 42 Connecticut Law Review, p 147. 
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nation state, remains one in which the majority of legal scholars is either not that interested, 
or sceptical about.
36
 In contrast, then, while the apparently “transnational” scope of EU law 
appears to be a logical consequence of “Europeanisation” processes, there is also the risk of a 
distinct blind-side. Pushing the boundaries of the European legal imagination towards a 
greater appreciation of the significance of studying law from both a comparative and, 
specifically, from a European and “integrationist” perspective, this energy-consuming effort 
sometimes has the tendency to push aside and, effectively, to render invisible important 
advances in the study of different countries’ (Member States’) law’s historical and colonial 
pasts.
37
 This sometimes manifests itself in an apparent nonchalance towards the nation states’ 
“darker legacies”
38
 as well as to their socio-economic specificities and their undeniable 
impact on European legal harmonisation projects.
39
 This orientation towards the (once) bright 
lights of the European integration process today produces a strangely intriguing mixture of 
mundane love-of-self-as-consumer, on the one hand,
40
 and a maturing interest in developing 
interdisciplinary research agendas to study the EU’s deeper embeddedness in its colonial 
past, on the other.
41
 
In what could be seen as a parallel universe that persists in the blind spots of 
mainstream legal education today, increasingly sophisticated research approaches have been 
developing with regard to the prospects of and the forms in which legal analytical instruments 
                                                 
36
  Martha Minow, “The Controversial Status of International and Comparative Law in the United States”, 
(2010) 52 Harvard International Law Journal Online, available at: http://www.harvardilj.org/wp. 
37
  But, see Christian Joerges, “Working through ‘bitter experiences’ towards a purified European identity: a 
critique on the disregard for history in European constitutional theory and practice”, in: Erik Oddvar Eriksen, 
Christian Joerges & Florian Rödl (eds), Law, Democracy and Solidarity in a Post-national Union: the 
Unsettled Political Order of Europe, (Oxford-New York, Routledge, 2006), p 335. 
38
  See Joseph HH Weiler, “Epilogue”, in: Christian Joerges & Navraj Singh Ghaleigh (eds), Darker Legacies 
of Law in Europe: The Shadow of National Socialism and Facism over Europe and its Legal Tradition, 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003), p 389; see the extensive commentaries on the project on the “Darker 
Legacies of Law in Europe” in the Symposium: “European Integration in the Shadow of Europe’s Darker 
Past: The ‘Darker Legacies of Law in Europe’ Revisited”, (Daniel Augenstein (ed)) (2006) 7 German Law 
Journal, pp 71-256. 
39
  Christian Joerges, Bo Stråth & Peter Wagner (eds), The Economy as a Polity: The Political Constitution of 
Contemporary Capitalism, (London, UCL Press, 2005); specifically on the area of corporate governance, see 
also the insightful essay by one of Europe’s great comparatists: Klaus J Hopt, “Common Principles of 
Corporate Governance in Europe?”, in: Joseph A McCahery, Piet Moerland, Theo Raaijmakers & Luc 
Renneboog (eds), Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity, (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2002), p 175. 
40
  Alexander Somek, “Accidental Cosmopolitanism”, (2012) 3 Transnational Legal Theory, p 371. 
41
  Philipp Dann & Felix Hanschmann, “Post-colonial Theories and Law”, (2012) 45 Law and Politics in 
Africa, Asia, Latin America - Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ), p 123. 
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and concepts - categories as well as basic understandings of nation state-originating legal 
institutions and processes - might, or might not, be adaptable to the regulatory challenges in a 
global space.
42
 In this vein, scholarship on “law and globalisation” appears to have become 
an industry in its own right. Yet, the focal point of this burgeoning scholarship remains far 
from precise. In other words, it does not seem evident what precisely or specifically is the 
question that law and globalisation scholars are actually trying to answer. What does seem 
clear, at the same time, is that the endeavours of legal scholars in this context have long 
become part of a multi-disciplinary study of global governance. As such, “law and 
globalisation” has become a field of scholarly inquiry that is belaboured by lawyers, political 
scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, geographers and political economists alike, which 
raises – yet again – important questions about how law should situate itself in relation to the 
approaches and methods of other disciplines. 
III.  HUMAN RIGHTS, LAW & DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE AS LEGAL FIELDS
43
 
The contributions to the present volume can be read against the above-described background 
of an increasingly rich overlay of disciplinary engagements with globalisation phenomena. A 
distinctive trait of these engagements is the recognition that the success of any inquiry 
depends on the awareness of the methodological challenges arising from the unruly nature of 
the object or objects under scrutiny. Transitional justice, one of our core fields in this essay 
collection, is a case in point.
44
 The same applies, arguably, to law and development [L&D], a 
field which has always been an area which can neither be neatly and clearly defined nor 
boxed into clear-cut categories. L&D has long been a battle field for opposing concepts of 
law, political and economic order and the role of institutional governance,
45
 and, as such, has 
                                                 
42
  A rich account and analysis is offered by William Twining. Globalisation and Legal Theory, (Evanston IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 2000); see, also, the Symposium on Twining’s 2011 Montesquieu Lecture at 
Tilburg University on “Globalization and Legal Research”, in: (2013) 4:3 Transnational Legal Theory. 
43
  The following section draws on Peer Zumbansen, “Knowledge in Development and Regulation, or How do 
we Distinguish between the Economic and the Non-Economic?”, in: Búrca, Fitzpatrick & Scott (eds.), note 1 
above. 
44
  Bell, note 7 above, p 5, at 7: “[…], by 2009, we have a broad, multidisciplinary field that subjects its own 
origins, assumptions and political significance to radical critique. Unlike other fields of study, which have 
taken decades to reach this point, transitional justice can be argued to have experienced a dramatically 
compressed trajectory of fieldhood.” 
45
  D Kennedy, “Laws and Development“, in: J Hatchard & A Perry-Kessaris (eds), Law and Development: 
Facing Complexity in the 21st Century - Essays in Honour of Peter Slinn (London, Cavendish Publishing 
Limited, 2003), p 17. 
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served as a laboratory for audacious experiments with explosive material. Categories such as 
“progress”,
46
 “development”
47
 or “order”, and the often elusive promises of the Rule of 
Law
48
 are invariably contentious concepts, and, in the context of L&D, frequently employed 
as bargaining chips in a high-stakes game over political and economic influence, autonomy 
and, emancipation.
49
 While specific local contexts of L&D became the loci of such 
contestation, often enough under the magnifying glass of international and national 
development agendas, market integration and state reform,
50
 one of the most striking 
discoveries to be made here relates to the fact that the contentious items in the L&D context 
are also those which have long informed a critical analysis of law and governance in the 
context of the nation state.
51
 As such, the boundaries between the developing and the 
developed world, between those countries receiving and those exporting or providing legal 
(or economic) aid, become porous, and a legal theory of L&D can fruitfully build on its older 
domestic sister. 
Among the important scholarly projects pursued by L&D scholars has been the 
discovery and analysis of the legal pluralist nature of the governance orders in the context of 
development.
52
 With a growing awareness of the different, existing ordering structures “on 
the ground” in the development context came the realisation that any legal order challenges 
the observer to acknowledge the parallels between, and the co-existence of, formal and 
informal, hard and soft law, of legal and non-legal norms.
53
 This realisation prompted L&D 
                                                 
46
  Thomas Skouteris, The Notion of Progress in International Law Discourse, (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser 
Press, 2010); Usha Natarajan, “TWAIL and the Environment: The State of Nature, the Nature of the State, 
and the Arab Spring”, (2012) 14 Oregon Review of International Law, p 177. 
47
  Escobar, note 5 above. 
48
  Jothie Rajah, Authoritarian Rule of Law: Legislation, Discourse and Legitimacy in Singapore, (New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
49
  For a brilliant deconstruction of the post-war conceptual division between political and economic 
emancipation of former colonial states, see Pahuja, Decolonising International Law, note 5 above. 
50
  World Bank, World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market, (Oxford-New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1996). 
51
  The masterful analysis is still Trubek & Galanter, “Scholars in Self-Estrangement”, note 1 above). 
52
  K Pistor & D Berkowitz, “Of Legal Transplants, Legal Irritants, and Economic Development”, in: P 
Cornelius & B Kogut (eds), Corporate Governance and Capital Flows in a Global Economy, (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2003), p 347; K Pistor, “The Standardization of Law and its Effect on Developing 
Economies”, (2002) 50 American Journal of Comparative Law, p 97. 
53
  HW Arthurs, Without the Law: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth Century England 
(Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1988); RA Macdonald & J MacLean, “No Toilets in Park”, (2005) 50 
McGill Law Journal, p 721; SF Moore, “Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Field as an 
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scholars not only to acknowledge but also to build upon the idea that many of the challenges 
pertaining to a law/non-law distinction that had been identified as specific to the development 
context, were, in fact, detachable from any legal governance framework. Indeed, the 
inadequacy of the existing legal governance thinking pointed to the need for a different 
theoretical - but also, doctrinal - attention.
54
 
It is this realisation that allows for a better appreciation of the questionable 
foundations of a legal “order”, of the embeddedness of legal governance in a particular 
institutional setting (for example, the “state”) and at a particular moment in (geo-political) 
time.
55
 To the degree that the struggle over law “reform” in the context of development is 
seen as not entirely removed from contestations of the legal (political, economic) order in the 
domestic context,
56
 L&D emerges as a field, which is just as much concerned with the 
relationship of law to its (particular, local) social environment and context as that has been 
the case for all other legal theoretical or legal sociological inquiries.
57
 But, accepting this 
perspective also implies accepting the loss of an outside observer’s standpoint. Precisely by 
acknowledging the inseparability of critical legal analysis in the domestic and the 
“development” context, we lose the comfort of being “outside” the very sphere which we are 
purporting both to study and to examine in a disinterested manner.
58
 Instead, the demarcation 
of the L&D context from that of one’s home legal system and jurisdiction becomes 
questionable in itself, because the assertions of law’s precariousness in the development 
context apply to the domestic home context with equal force. Upon this basis, the distinction 
between governance challenges of “there” and “here” appears artificial. Indeed, the 
distinction seems designed to insulate the domestic context from critique while depicting the 
development context as deficient and requiring “aid” and assistance. The identification of a 
                                                                                                                                                        
Appropriate Subject of Study”, (1973) 7 Law & Society Review, p 719. 
54
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55
  Begoña Aretxaga, “Maddening States”, (2003) 32 Annual Review of Anthropology, p 393. 
56
  David Kennedy, “Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance”, (2005) 27 Sydney Journal 
of International Law, p 5. 
57
  Cotterrell, note 26 above, p 171; R Banakar, “Law Through Sociology’s Looking Glass: Conflict and 
Competition in Sociological Studies of Law”, in: A Denis & D Kalekin-Fishman (eds), The ISA Handbook 
in Contemporary Sociology, (London, Sage Publications, 2009); P Zumbansen, “Law’s Effectiveness and 
Law’s Knowledge: Reflections from Legal Sociology and Legal Theory”, (2009) 10 German Law Journal, p 
417. 
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  Trubek and Galanter, note 1 above. See, also, DM Trubek, “Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on 
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series of legal governance questions as arising from within the context of a “developing 
country” inevitably leads to these questions having to be seen as being already pertinent 
much “earlier”, namely, already present and evident in the context of domestic legal critique. 
A striking feature of this contextualisation of L&D as part of a larger exercise in 
investigating law’s relationship to and its role in society, is the way in which the field opens 
itself up to an engagement and exchange with complementary discourses about regulatory 
places and spaces. Both legal scholars
59
 and sociologists
60
 have been scrutinising the 
conceptual and constituted nature of such regulatory spaces; spaces which escape a 
straightforward depiction from a single discipline’s vantage point. Just as this critique has 
become pertinent with regard to the analysis of different, specialised regulatory arenas, 
ranging from labour
61
 to corporate law,
62
 from environmental
63
 to criminal law,
64
 altogether 
suggesting a methodological shift from comparative to transnational law,
65
 L&D has become 
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p 211. 
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a very active sphere for a renewed, critical and contextual analysis of law in a fast-changing 
and volatile environment. 
This aspect has been underlined, perhaps most tellingly, by the recent approximation 
of L&D with the field of “transitional justice”, which testifies to an increasing awareness 
among interested experts of the close connections between investigations into the “legacies” 
of past injustices with programmes of future-directed legal and economic aid.
66
 It is this 
disciplinary overlap and the growing intersections between L&D and TJ which allows for a 
critical investigation into their “shared logics”,
67
 as several of the authors to the present 
collection illustrate. Due to concerns of space, the editors decided to omit the inclusion of 
one, closely-related field of scholarly analysis – literary critique, which prominently draws on 
novels and poetry to shed light on the relations between literature and academic trajectories 
of development, transitional justice and post-colonial studies.
68
 Among such literature, we 
find works that treat themes closely connected to, and often overlapping with, the noted 
scholarly engagement: here, we find a vibrant “literary”
69
 and cultural engagement with 
“transition” periods. After the seminal (inevitably colonial) portrayals by Joseph Conrad in 
“An Outpost of Progress” (1897) or “Heart of Darkness” (1899), post-colonial novels such as 
the late Chinua Achebe’s “Things Fall Apart” (1958) and JM Coetzee’s “Waiting for the 
Barbarians” (1980) poignantly scrutinise the slippery slope between “us” and “them” that 
inescapably pervades any “intervention” or “development” context. As Anne Orford has 
described in the context of public international law’s attempts to address transnational 
military and civil conflict, we need to take a close look at the hidden, hegemonic aspirations 
of recent instances of “humanitarian intervention”.
70
 Excavating the challenges of concepts 
such as “change”, “reform” and “progress”, as they have been central to seminal transitional 
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justice debates as those concerning South Africa
71
 or Sri Lanka,
72
 Achmat Dangor’s “Bitter 
Fruit” (2001)
73
 or films such as Prasanna Vithanage’s Death on a Full Moon Day, have 
become inseparably intertwined with the scholarly, “expert” discourse around these instances 
of transitional justice.
74
 
The essays in the present collection are authored by scholars with a wide range of 
scholarly expertise as well as practical experience in L&D and TJ. These two areas have 
become pivotal signifiers of the ways in which lawyers interested in comparative and 
international law have – over time – developed very focused and nuanced approaches to the 
dynamics that characterise the emerging political and legal orders. Such transition states often 
result, for example, from military and/or political transformation due to either violent regime 
change or peaceful democratic transition, and raise pressing questions regarding the role of, 
say, criminal law and the persecution of the previous regime’s human-rights violations or that 
of international law in assisting or facilitating the new regime’s legal-political 
consolidation.
75
 With an almost overwhelming number of aspects to be addressed in a volatile 
development or transition context, scholars have fruitfully been debating how law, possibly 
aided by other disciplines, can adequately identify, address, and eventually remedy the 
virulent questions arising in such contexts. In this vein, one of the field’s leading scholars, 
has observed that: 
“The universe of transitional justice can be broadly or narrowly defined. At its 
broadest, it involves anything that a society devises to deal with a legacy of conflict 
and/or widespread human rights violations, from changes in criminal codes to those 
in high school textbooks, from creation of memorials, museums and days of 
mourning, to police and court reform, to tackling the distributional inequities that 
                                                 
71
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(London, Bodley Head, 2011). 
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underlie conflict. A narrow view can be criticized for ignoring root causes and 
privileging civil and political rights over economic, social or cultural rights, and by so 
doing marginalizing the needs of women and the poor. On the other hand, broadening 
the scope of what we mean by transitional justice to encompass the building of a just 
as well as peaceful society may make the effort so broad as to become 
meaningless.”
76
 
Ruti Teitel, author of the widely acclaimed 2000 monograph on Transitional Justice, 
put the following questions at the outset of her investigation: 
“How should societies deal with their evil pasts? […] How is the social understanding 
behind a new regime committed to the rule of law created? Which legal acts have 
transformative significance? What, if any, is the relation between a state’s response to 
its repressive past and its prospects for creating a liberal order? What is law’s 
potential for ushering in liberalization?”
77
 
These questions have since been taken up within a wide range of scholarly and 
practical engagement, leading, inter alia, to the creation or further consolidation of 
specialised research institutions, including the International Center for Transitional Justice in 
New York City,
78
 the Transitional Justice Centre at the University of Ulster,
79
 and the Centre 
for Transitional Justice and Post Conflict Reconstruction in Ontario.
80
 The increasing 
importance of TJ not only as an investigative pool but also as a platform for a border-crossing 
and interdisciplinary collaboration among human-rights scholars, criminal lawyers, 
international lawyers, anthropologists and sociologists, reflects on the complexity of issues 
addressed under the heading of TJ. It is this complexity that the present volume wishes to 
address in order to bring together the work of some of the leading scholars in the field. But, at 
the same time, the essays in this book encompass an even wider range of aspects than that 
already falling within the ambit of TJ. We approximate TJ with the equally complex field of 
L&D because, on the one hand, we think that the issues just addressed in association with 
                                                 
76
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transitional justice have, in many ways, been central, explicitly or implicitly, in the work 
carried out by L&D scholars and practitioners. On the other, however, we believe that the 
dialogue between L&D and TJ about shared concerns and research targets is only in its early 
stages,
81
 and is likely to produce a significant increase in our understanding of the intricate 
connections between development and aid policies, laws and economics, on the one hand, 
and the continuously proliferating field of transitional justice, on the other.
82
 
The collected essays in the area of L&D in this volume build on seminal scholarship 
since the 1970s, a time at which hopes even on the political left were particularly high with 
regard to the potential for law to play a significant role in the aid and assistance programmes 
that were being rolled out under the policy directives of the International organisations and 
the United States.
83
 As terms such as “development”, “aid” and “reform” would suggest, one 
of the most treacherous aspects of the associated programmes was the implicit assumption of 
competence, authority and – arguably – righteousness – in the design and delivery of such 
“assistance” programmes to countries around the world.
84
 Critique against a predominantly 
Western- and, more precisely, United States-spirited wave of “assistance” and “development” 
programmes formed early and consistently, pointing to the pitfalls of policy programmes 
which all too often prioritised the relevance of private commercial enterprise over the pursuit 
of public policy,
85
 and, in dramatic ways, neglected to account for the causes of the current 
state of countries now receiving “assistance”.
86
 Similarly, a poignant critique raised in the 
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context of a number of humanitarian-aid initiatives was the failure of those designing the 
programme to consider more adequately the deeper, “root” causes of the conflicts at the 
centre of the interventions.
87
 
A pertinent aspect of the increasing overlap of L&D and TJ is the role of law and, 
particularly, that of rights. Human rights were central to early assessments of states of 
“underdevelopment” and, as a consequence, the development of a rights regime, embedded in 
a system of “rule of law”, was seen as an essential prerequisite in the facilitation of societal, 
legal, economic and political progress.
88
 However, as critics have long been arguing, human 
rights do not exist in a vacuum, but can only be explained within a comprehensive legal 
system, creating manifold rights and countervailing duties and obligations.
89
 In the context of 
L&D, the critique of rights focused, even at an early stage, on the volatility of human rights 
assertions in precarious political conditions, characterised by social-economic inequality and 
great disparages in the actually existing access to justice conditions. Even “advanced” stages 
of L&D reform, introducing concerns with the “social”, fell privy to a convincing critique of 
the programmes’ failure to facilitate and to consolidate a solid rights and entitlements regime, 
rather than complementing insufficient rule-of-law implements with arbitrary welfare or 
equity insertions.
90
 
This focus on the centrality - but precariousness - of rights in the context of post-
conflict, transitional states and emerging economies continues to be a central concern in the 
evolving regulatory and normative landscape of development and transitional justice. To the 
degree that human rights have come to represent institutionalised entitlements, which are 
both instruments of power as well as bargaining chips in struggles over autonomy and 
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sovereignty, they play a central role in the continuing debates regarding the goals of 
development and transition. 
These debates, to be sure, occur within an immensely complex context, rich with 
competing assertions of the conditions and trajectories of human-rights developments and of 
the interests invested in granting rights to these or other concerns.
91
 The scope of such 
contestations has, however, largely expanded, to the degree that policy concerns as expressed, 
for example, in the context of development or transitional justice programmes, have become 
quasi-boundary-less. In other words, questions pertaining to the role of law in post-conflict 
Iraq or the World Bank’s leadership in aid to Africa are, in many ways, no longer confined to 
these particular destinations. Instead, these concerns have become global in the way that they 
raise pressing questions which tie issues related to Iraq to those associated with global 
concerns with security and stability in the Middle East, with human-rights protection, as well 
as with economic interests and geo-political considerations. Likewise, any attempt even at 
“helping” or “developing” Africa (or, India,
92
 or Latin America
93
) would have to start by 
taking into account the complex and intricate history of Africa’s role in the world, a history 
that has been told too often from the colonisers’ perspective and is now being told from 
within.
94
 In other words, “rights, development and transitional justice” – the triad, which 
provides the title elements to our book – have become the central grounds of contestation 
under the larger umbrella of “global governance”, the latter having attained the status of an 
adequately encompassing - as well as timely depiction of - regulatory and normative 
challenges which can no longer be confined to the level of the nation state or the sphere of 
international law.
95
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IV.  MAPPING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE DISCOURSES: CONVERGENCE, 
CONTESTATION AND CRITIQUE 
The present volume can be read as a contribution to the body of scholarly responses to the 
changes in global governance since the end of the Cold War, especially in the unfolding “post 
September 11, 2001” period, which have identified a re-configuration, at the levels of both 
theory and practice, of formerly isolated fields and concerns, including human rights, law, 
and development, as well as post-conflict or, transitional justice.
96
 The task of surveying each 
of these fields would be Sisyphean, not only because their boundaries appear, across a survey 
of various types of literature, as both fluid and porous, but also because the number of 
publications both within and among them continues to multiply. Furthermore, we have 
recognised that even the implied standpoint from which one might undertake such a survey 
cannot be presumptively assumed, neither by ourselves as editors, nor by the individual 
contributors. There are no innocent starting-points. And yet, this does not imply an abdication 
of the responsibility to engage critically with these rapidly evolving discourses. Rather, the 
aim of the volume is precisely to draw attention to an extant body of critical scholarship that 
assumes this task. Not only do these essays individually offer nuanced accounts from a range 
of contexts in which human-rights advocacy and transitional-justice initiatives are 
increasingly in collision with development projects, programmes and objectives,
97
 but 
collectively, they might be read as the beginning, partial and evocative, to be sure, of a 
methodological mapping of a re-invigorated and globalised field of critical legal scholarship. 
In the first part of the volume, the chapters explore the dimensions and dynamics of 
human-rights discourse in the development context.
98
 In recent years, the apparent 
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convergence between the fields of human rights and development,
99
 as expressed in various 
documents issued by the UN and by development institutions such as the World Bank, have 
attracted both praise and support from scholars and development practitioners.
100
 Yet, human 
rights and development, until quite recently, as a matter of professional expertise as well as 
practical application, had, for a long time, moved along separate tracks.
101
 Indeed, in many 
post-independence contexts, they were understood as emanating from distinct sources, 
requiring different sets of policies and programmes, and presenting potentially conflicting 
demands.
102
 In light of this history, contemporary approaches that posit human rights and 
development as not only potentially congenial, but also axiomatically and self-evidently so, 
beg further inquiry.
103
 As one of our authors has observed elsewhere: 
“despite the incorporation of human rights into the development agenda and efforts to 
represent the promotion of both human rights and development as fundamentally 
coterminous enterprises, it is clear that many questions concerning the links between 
social and economic rights and the trajectory of social transformation and economic 
development policy remain.”
104
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These questions might also include: 
“How economic development priorities are identified, which groups are consulted in 
the process of formulating them, how policies are implemented and risks and 
entitlements allocated, and how the associated costs and benefits are distributed.”
105
 
In so far as the proposed volume is offered as a response to these concerns, it seeks to 
address both the macro-historical and legal-theoretical dimensions of these questions, as well 
as the dilemmas presented by their instantiation in particular (symbolic and institutional) 
locations. 
The essays on transitional justice that are featured in the second part of the volume 
similarly engage with the complexity of increasingly intertwined discourses. It is here, in the 
amorphous and intensely belaboured field of international, local and mixed criminal courts 
and tribunals, global human-rights discourse and human-rights litigation,
106
 truth 
commissions, village courts and assertions of “retroactive justice”,
107
 that the internal 
dependency of these particularised discourses on the debates addressed in the areas of L&D, 
humanitarian intervention and occupation becomes visible. The intensive efforts of human-
rights activists, constitutional and criminal-law experts over the past few years to bring 
human-rights violators to justice,
108
 while scrutinising the challenges arising from 
“humanitarian interventions” that were not authorised under public international law,
109
 
                                                                                                                                                        
(eds), Stones of Hope: How African Activists Reclaim Human Rights to Challenge Global Poverty, (Stanford 
CA, Stanford University Press), p 93. 
105
  Ibid. 
106
  Craig Scott, “Introduction to Torture as Tort: From Sudan to Canada to Somalia”, in: idem (ed), Torture as 
Tort, (Oxford-Portland OR-Antwerp, Hart Publishing-Intersentia, 2001), p 3; Robert Wai, “Countering, 
Branding, Dealing: Using Economic and Social Rights in and around the International Trade Regime”, 
(2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, p 35-84. 
107
  Makoto Usami, “Retroactive Justice: Trials for Human Rights Violations under a Prior Regime”, in: Burton 
M Leiser & Tom D Campbell (eds), Human Rights in Philosophy and Practice, (Aldershot, Ashgate 
Publishing, 2001), p 423. 
108
  See Craig Scott, “Translating Torture into Transnational Tort: Conceptual Divides in the Debate on 
Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Harms”, in: idem, Torture as Tort, note 106 above, p 45, and 
the other contributions in this volume; see also Beth Stephens, “Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and 
International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations”, (2002) 27 
Yale Journal of International Law, p 1; see, also, Jeremy Sarkin, “Reparation for Past Wrongs: Using 
Domestic Courts Around the World, Especially the United States, to Pursue Human Rights Claims”, (2004) 
32 International Journal of Legal Information, p 426; Arturo J Carrillo, “Bringing International Law Home: 
The Innovative Role of Human Rights Clinics in the Transnational Legal Process”, (2004) 35 Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review, p 527. 
109
  See, only, Anne Orford, “Muscular Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the New Interventionism”, 
23 
 
suggest a pressing need for a more encompassing and rigorous critical approach. It has 
become clear that a better understanding of the present situation of comparative constitutional 
politics, legal aid and law reform in post-conflict and transition societies crucially depends 
upon this rethinking. 
While several of the chapters (Issa Shivji (Chapter 2), Ananya Mukerjee-Reed 
(Chapter 3)) acknowledge the segmentation of these fields at the level of practice that, until 
quite recently, allowed experts in development, for example, to consider rights concerns 
“somebody else’s job”,
110
 and others (Alywin & Coombe (Chapter 6)) document new actors 
and advocacy practices that have emerged in the era of “rights-based development”, all of the 
chapters in the present volume address the role of power inequalities, as well as the important 
place of social and political contestation in relation to recent developments. These approaches 
provide an important counterpoint to strands of scholarly and institutional discourse that have 
been much more sanguine, even celebratory, regarding the potential for new, more 
encompassing, mechanisms of global governance, in order to avoid the errors and pitfalls of 
past practices.
111
 
The discourse of convergence is illustrated, for example, by UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan’s 2005 Report, entitled “In Larger Freedom: towards Development, Security and 
Human Rights for all.” The Report cogently observed: 
“we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without 
development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights. Unless 
all these causes are advanced, none will succeed.”
112
 
Since the late 1990s, a growing number of international institutions and agencies have 
taken up this call to move towards a more integrated, or comprehensive, approach.
113
 At the 
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level of practice, one effect of these developments can be traced through the proliferation of 
projects under the increasingly capacious category of the “Rule of Law”.
114
 
Our review of the “convergence” literature reveals a tendency to focus on the ways in 
which the fields can, or should, mutually enforce each other.
115
 It is not uncommon to trace 
convergences between transitional justice and development upon the basis of their shared 
aspirations for a better future for the citizens of a particular nation, for example. The 
contributors to this volume, however, remind us to attend to the ways in which these types of 
discussion already assume the illusory narrative of progress that lies at the heart of the 
development project.
116
 Along a different vector, even very robust and otherwise critical 
analyses of the relationship between development and human rights tend to focus on potential 
compatibilities, rather than on conflicts.
117
 Yet, the enthusiasm with which the discussion of 
potential synergies between the fields of development, human rights, and transitional justice 
has been embraced by both scholars and practitioners has drawn scholarly and public 
attention away from the difficult choices and necessary trade-offs that are a routine part of the 
development enterprise.
118
 
Rather than joining with the institutional or scholarly quest for an “integrated 
approach”, a number of the essays in this volume identify this move (towards a 
“comprehensive approach”) as a key aspect of contemporary developments which calls for a 
more differentiated analysis and critique.
119
 One thing that is of particular interest to us is the 
way in which law, in its technocratic guise, is increasingly understood as instrumental to each 
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of these fields: human rights, development and transitional justice.
120
 In a context in which 
enduring solutions to the world’s problems, such as the slogan inscribed on the entrance to 
the World Bank Building in New York; “Our dream is a world free of poverty”, continue to 
elude the international community, institutions such as the World Bank have embraced the 
“rule of law” as a development strategy.
121
 The “rule of law” is also understood as 
fundamental to the success of transitional-justice initiatives, and is seen as essential to greater 
realisation of international human rights within given states. The turn to law plays an 
analogous role in each of these fields: in the context of deeply-politicised policy decisions, a 
technocratic understanding of the “rule of law” both grounds and legitimates the interventions 
of international agencies in the domestic affairs of states. In this account, it is the 
understanding of law itself, and particularly the specific role which can be played by a 
particular conception of the “rule of law” in the international arena that is in transition, rather 
than human rights, development or transitional justice as such. 
Our approach stands in contrast to previous exercises in “bridge-building” between 
these fields, which have sought to draw these separate strands together from within the 
functional logics or shared foundational assumptions of one, or occasionally, two fields.
122
 
Building upon shared foundations can serve to re-inforce implicit assumptions, rather than 
subjecting them, as several of our authors do, to closer scrutiny. Within the fields in question, 
the shared founding assumptions - arguably - include the problematical dichotomies of old 
world/new world, civilised/barbaric, developed/underdeveloped, donor/recipient, as well as 
the hierarchies that are both supported and justified by these dichotomies. The unique 
contribution of the present volume is to pose the encounter between the fields without 
replicating or assuming the logics that underpin them. That is, this volume both offers critical 
engagement with these developments and provides us with the opportunity to consider some 
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of the risks presented by the convergence of the teleologies of human rights, development, 
and transition. Consequently, it is not surprising that many of these chapters are cautious and 
cautionary, rather than celebratory, regarding recent developments. 
In our contemporary engagement with critical scholarship on development, human 
rights and transitional justice, we have found it useful to re-visit the landmark critique of law 
and development formulated by David Trubek and Marc Galanter, who identified three 
categories, or grounds of critique. These are the critique of universality, referring to the 
ethnocentrism of the liberal legalist paradigm, the critique of formal law’s potency and the 
significance of informal ordering mechanisms, and the “dark face” of legal reform critique, 
which acknowledges that reform efforts may frequently have consequences such as 
empowering élites, or containing protest, not intended by liberal reformers.
123
 And, although 
these insights have been taken up and expanded up by critical scholars in a great many fields 
over the intervening decades, the persistence of ambitious, formalist and instrumental 
approaches to law reform in development- and transitional-justice projects, most recently re-
framed in the language of rights, suggest that legal scholars and lawyers in development 
contexts continue to be loathe to abandon their disciplinary commitments to legal efficacy, 
even in the face of considerable evidence to the contrary. For example, a number of scholars 
have recently both extended and illustrated the argument that, in the encounter with 
development agencies, human rights have largely become re-formulated as a mode of 
regulation, in a manner that largely neutralises their potential to be used in contentious 
politics.
124
 At the same time, critical scholarship also reminds us that the role of political 
mobilisation on the part of emergent activist groups within this development has never been 
more significant.
125
 Kerry Rittich sums it up well when she notes that “in second generation 
reforms, human rights are better understood not as the answer to the social deficit but as the 
terrain of struggle”.
126
 In this contested and uncertain landscape, the work of critical legal 
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scholars - including those whose essays are included in this collection and the many others 
cited herein - plays an increasingly vital role in questioning assumptions, containing 
expectations, and challenging the power of entrenched institutions. The contributions to the 
present volume mark important milestones in the continuing engagement with law’s role in 
development and transitional justice, and we trust that our readers will find in them a host of 
helpful and inspiring introductions to a field of discourse which is of growing importance – 
both in inter-disciplinary scholarship as well as in practice. 
